Response to Stephen Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument by Valerie Libby

Sometime around 350 B.C.E., Aristotle set out to develop a universal method by which a person could learn all there is to know. The result was the idea of categorical logic and the familiar formulation of the syllogism. Although it seems inadvisable to simplify (or at least oversimplify) the idea of the syllogism, for purposes of explanation it is often done, and in fact Toulmin himself does so in this excerpt. He explains the syllogism with "the time honored example: Socrates is a man; All men are mortal; So Socrates is mortal." Toulmin admits that this is just one of the many types of syllogism, but it is an example sufficient for his purpose which it to offer a criticism and a new pattern by which arguments may be made.

Toulmin’s pattern includes six elements: data, warrant, claim, backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals. The first three elements (and/or sometimes the fourth, as Toulmin explains), correlate closely to Aristotle’s major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. It is the next three elements that distinguish Toulmin’s pattern. Toulmin first introduces the concepts of data, claim, and warrant. Data is the foundation of an argument which moves an individual to a given conclusion. Warrants are "general, hypothetical statements which can act as bridges, and authorise the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us." Similar to Aristotle’s minor premise, the warrant is what provides the individual with a general framework within which the reasoning of an argument takes place. A claim is the conclusion which one wishes to prove. This is simple enough, but, as Toulmin illustrates, any argument which contains a human component, in other words any argument outside of the field of mathematics, opens this formulation to a number of potential problems.

The human factor seems to be the major fault that Toulmin finds with formal logic. Like Aristotle, he seeks a logical structure that will allow the acquisition of knowledge across fields. The first step to assessing arguments in order to determine their usefulness across these fields, is to determine which parts of an argument are field-invariant and which are field-dependent. Toulmin calls for a common lexicon with regards to argument which transcends particular disciplines and allows individuals in mathematics, law, ethics, and all other areas to share a dialogue with regard to the validity of arguments. In order to facilitate this dialogue, he offers the additional elements of argument which he calls "backing," "qualifiers," and "rebuttals."

Backing is essentially the evidence given to support a warrant. While the two elements are closely tied, their difference is vital. Backing validates the warrant by explaining why it may be assumed to be true. It may take the form of statutory law, mathematical principle, or ethical standard, or any number of other rules or codes. Confusion between the idea of backing and that of warrant is one of the primary flaws that Toulmin sees in the Aristotelian syllogism. Often an argument in syllogistic form may substitute backing for warrant which in turn leads to ambiguities within the argument. By differentiating between the two elements, Toulmin feels he has made an innovative discovery which will lead to clarification and correction of this problem. Maybe this is true, but it seems that in many cases, the ramifications of substituting backing for warrant in an argument are minimal if they exist at all.

As for qualifiers and rebuttals, they are basically pre-emptive strikes against potential challenges to the validity of an argument. Qualifiers indicate the "strength inferred by the warrant . . . " by qualifying the likelihood that a conclusion is true with words such as "presumably" or "almost certainly," while rebuttals denote possible exceptions to the warrant and therefore to the validity of the claim. These elements seem directed less at strengthening the argument than they are at protecting the arguer from potential criticism.

In attempting to expand upon traditional patterns of logic in order to render them more universally applicable, Toulmin confronts common-sense problems with the Aristotelian syllogism. These problems are not new, and in dealing with them Toulmin admits that "If the purpose of an argument is to establish conclusions about which we are not entirely confident by relating them back to other information about which we have greater assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful whether any genuine, practical argument could ever be properly analytic." This observation is in itself a confession regarding Toulmin’s theory because it is precisely the problem one encounters with any theory of argument. There will always be exceptions to the rules of logic, and it is debatable whether or not complicating the patterns used to infer new knowledge in order to allow for these exceptions is advisable since an absolute theory is inconceivable. If Toulmin’s theory fails to solve the ambiguities which exist in formal logic, it succeeds in revealing in understandable terms the nature of the problem which may be as important of a task.

Response to Logic and the Criticism of Arguments

In this short excerpt, Toulmin introduces three contentions regarding the criticism of arguments. First, he states that in looking at the validity of an argument one must look both at the technical merit of the argument presented which Toulmin labels "analytical" and also at the applicability of the argument which he calls "topical." This distinction is important. Flawless but irrelevant arguments abound. Second, the criticism of these two separate components should employ distinct vocabulary, presumably to avoid confusion. Finally, when criticizing topical arguments, one must consider the field-dependence of the argument. This lecture, published twenty-four years after The Uses of Argument employs a much softer tone than Toulmin’s earlier work. Toulmin calls for a kind of brotherhood among those who study and utilize argument in all fields. He states in this lecture that "the general pattern of reasoning . . . is quite intelligible to lay people as well" as professionals. Although the subject matter of this lecture is of use to a much smaller audience than that of The Uses of Argument, the text is more accessible to the reader, perhaps because of the original form of delivery—one written and one spoken.

Work Cited

Bizzell, Patricia and Bruce Herzberg, eds. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from

Classical Times to the Present. Boston: Bedford, 1990.